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WHY KANT
George P. Fletcher
These essays are the outgrowth of a conference on Kantian Legal
Theory held at the the Arden Homestead in Harriman, New York, September 26-28, 1986.1 Some of them are versions of papers originally
presented at the conference (Weinrib, Murphy, Finnis, Fletcher); others
are a response to the three days of provocative discussion (Richards,
Grey, Benson).2 The underlying premise of the conference was that
although philosophers and academic lawyers have devoted considerable attention to Kant's moral theory, very few have written much about
Kant's legal theory. I should add: written in English.3 The recent German literature overflows with books and articles about the long neglected Rechtslehre.4 The purpose of the conference, at least in part, was
to correct this imbalance and to direct the attention of North Americans to Kant's importance as a legal thinker as well as a philosopher of
theoretical and practical reason.
There was another purpose as well. But to state my own aims in
organizing this event, I must digress and offer a personal, perhaps idiosyncratic, account of the current intellectual scene in North American
law schools.
From the second world war to Kennedy's assassination and for several years thereafter, a consensus prevailed in law schools about the
policies that should guide the law's development. The reigning policies
were these: (1) in tort law: cost spreading, compensation of victims
and discouragement of excessive risk taking; (2) in contracts: facilitation of economically productive exchanges; and (3) in criminal law: deterrence and confinement of dangerous offenders. The pursuit of these
1. The conference was supported by a grant from the Liberty Fund, Indianapolis,
Indiana.
2. The other participants were Bruce Ackerman, Meir Dan-Cohen, Douglas Dryer,
Kent Greenawalt, Mary Gregor, Herbert Morris, Wolfgang Naucke, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Donald Regan, and Robert Paul Wolff.
3. The legal theory is found primarily in the Rechtslehre, which is the first half of the
I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). Many libraries have the complete translation,
The Philosophy of Law (Rechtslehre) (W. Hastie trans. 1887) [hereinafter Philosophy of
Law]. The current, partial and flawed translation, The Metaphysical Elements ofJustice
(J.Ladd trans. 1965) (Rechtslehre) [hereinafter Metaphysical Elements ofJustice], is more
widely used. A full and accurate translation is necessary in order to direct more attention to this segment of Kantian theory. About the only book on Kantian legal theory in
English is the useful monographJ. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right (1970). For
some valuable comments on Kant's concept of law, see M. Gregor, Laws of Freedom
(1963).
4. See, e.g., H. G. Deggau, Die Aporien der Rechtslehre Kants (1983); W. Kersting,
Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, Bd. 20, 1984); K. Kiihl,
Eigentumsordnung als Freiheitsordnung (Reihe Praktische Philosophie, Bd. 20, 1984);
Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie (Z. Batscha ed. 1976).
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policies in the least costly way defines a utilitarian approach to legal
decision making. Brainerd Currie captured the reigning faith in policy
analysis by insisting that the only sound basis for any law is the promotion of "governmental interests"-utilitarian policies by another
name. 5
So far as I know, there was no serious opposition to this orthodoxy
of the law schools. An opposing view might have come from a natural
lawyer. But no one like John Finnis was writing at the time. 6 An argument for the internal integrity of the common law might have been
heard, but Ernest Weinrib had yet to speak out. 7 Perhaps someone seriously might have advanced an argument for retributive punishment,
but neither Herbert Morris 8 nor Jeffrie Murphy 9 had yet protested
against the reigning utilitarian orthodoxy.
In a recent description of the scene circa 1960,10 Richard Posner
claims that the prevailing consensus consisted of both agreement on
general political objectives and a general aversion to interdisciplinary
studies in the law. 1 He is obviously right that the liberal consensus of
that period has dissolved in the face of new groups-blacks, women,
2
activist Jews, gays-entering the debate over fundamental rights.'
Looking back on the politics of our pre-liberation America, one wonders who was arguing with whom. It seems like most of us were then in
the closet or in the wings waiting to join the action.
Posner also argues that the last quarter century has witnessed a
radical change in attitude towards interdisciplinary studies. 13 I wonder
whether he is right and indeed how we would go about assessing
whether or not he is. From the standpoint of the interdisciplinary studies, the leading law schools in the Kennedy era were perhaps more serious places than they are today. Ehrenzweig in the West 14 and Joe
Goldstein' 5 in the East were culling the psychoanalytic literature for
applications to legal problems. Kalven and Zeisel were then engaged in
5. See, e.g., Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws

Method, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus
Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958).
6. SeeJ. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980).

7. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & Phil. 37 (1983).
8. H. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in On Guilt and Innocence 31 (1976).
9. SeeJ. Murphy, supra note 3, at 140-44.
10. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987).
11. Id. at 766.
12. Id. at 764-67.
13. Id. at 767-69.
14. See, e.g., A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence (1971); Ehrenzweig, A
Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea-Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility
and Insanity in the Death Cell, 73 Yale LJ. 425 (1964), revised in 1 Crim. L. Bull., Nov.
1965, at 3.
15. See, e.g.,J. Goldstein, A. Dershowitz & R. Schwartz, Criminal Law: Theory and
Process (1974);J. Goldstein &J. Katz, The Family and the Law (1965).
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their path-breaking study of the jury system. 16 Calabresi was writing
his first major article in a field that later came to be called Law & Economics.' 7 A generation earlier, Llewellyn had lived with the Cheyenne
Indians and studied their law ways.' 8 Perhaps, as Posner maintains,
there was not much going on at Harvard. 19 But at Yale, Chicago, and
Berkeley scholars approached neighboring disciplines with a zeal and
open-mindedness that can still serve as a model to the profession.
What has changed, for good or ill, is an enormous shift in the
center of gravity of interdisciplinary studies. Psychoanalysis and sociology are out; economics is in. In the early 1960's, the common view was
that the law could not progress in its policy-making unless we had a
better understanding of human behavior. 20 The disciplines in fashion
were those that sought to understand the curious way that concrete individuals behave in their legal interactions.
Given that aspiration in the early 1960's, it is odd that law faculties
should have shifted their loyalties to economics, a field that assumes the
rational pursuit of self-interest in its model of human interaction. It is
hard to imagine an assumption more foreign to the behavioral sciences.
The best account of this shift comes from Leff, who attributes the appeal of economics to the yearning of law professors to feel empirical
while they remained sitting in their armchairs. 2 1 The simplicity of the
economic model enabled law professors to apply a method that produced results, and if not results, at least a great deal of literature.
Let us suppose, however, that Posner is correct in claiming an upsurge of interest in interdisciplinary studies. The connection between
that trend and the disintegration of the political consensus is not at all
clear. Posner claims that both testify to the decline of law as an "autonomous discipline." 22 But what does it mean to say that law is a "discipline" and moreover an "autonomous discipline?" I suppose a
"discipline"-with mathematics as the model-presupposes well-defined criteria of argument, assertion and proof. To the extent that legal
argument is now more overtly political than it once was, the law is that
much less of a discipline: arguments reflect personal commitments
more than the consequence of a shared method of working with
sources. A discipline is autonomous, apparently, if it floats on its own
16. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury (1966).
17. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale
LJ. 499 (1961).

18. K. Llewellyn & E.A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1941).
19. Posner, supra note 10, at 763. For another description of the prevailing orthodoxy at Harvard under the sway of Hart and Sacks, see Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 61-91
(describing "legal instrumentalism").
20. See supra notes 14 & 15.
21. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 Va. L.
Rev. 451, 455-59 (1974).
22. Posner, supra note 10, at 766-67.
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bottom, without relying on timber cannibalized from someone else's
vessel. In this sense, interdisciplinary work undermines the "autonomy" of legal studies.
The notion of "autonomous law" conveys more than Posner attributes to it. The term suggests that judges can and do decide cases
solely on the basis of legal materials-i.e., as "mechanical" decision
makers. In the post-Realist age, it would be difficult to find an academic who takes the "autonomy" of the law seriously in this strong
sense. The weaker sense of the term used by Posner stresses the virtues of Kelsen's "pure" theory of law. Kelsen argued that the law
should stand as its own discipline, free of politics and independent of
23
other bodies of knowledge.
Until recently, I never understood why Kelsen's influence was so
much greater in Latin America than in the English-speaking world. A
conversation in Havana with a Cuban professor 24 brought home the
appeal of the pure theory of law in countries where the alternative is
coerced deference to the reigning political ideology. Because Americans are less fearful that any of the political currents now coursing
through the law could ever become an official line to which we must
adhere, we casually abandon the line between legal studies and politics,
and between law and other disciplines, such as sociology and economics, that are vulnerable to political control.
The correct meaning of "autonomy" in law may not be worth arguing about, but it is important to get clear about the current intellectual
landscape. It matters whether we regard the shift toward law and economics (L&E) as connected, in some important way, with the infusion
of new political perspectives in the ongoing legal debate. I don't think
that it is, except perhaps by accident of the personalities who ply the
trade of micro-economics. Yet there is a widespread view that the practitioners of L&E stand for a right wing political agenda. One hears this
claim most often from the self-styled left in the law schools, the surprisingly influential movement of Critical Legal Studies (CLS).
It is worth pausing to reflect on several characteristics of these two
schools of thought, L&E and CLS, for these two are the best-organized,
most ambitious voices in the law schools today. Eventually, I shall argue that the Kantian arguments reflected in this symposium represent a
third way in legal thought, but first a few words about the competition
supposedly on the right and on the left.
If one focuses on a group of people talking about ideas, and one
wants to know whether they represent either a discipline or a school of
thought, the first questions to ask, I think, are these: (1) Is there a common text that everyone in the school has mastered and can discuss
competently? (2) Is there a shared understanding about what consti23. H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M. Knight trans. 1967).
24. The conversation took place in March 1986.
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tutes a contribution (a good argument or insightful point) within the
discourse of the school? I would submit that without a shared understanding about which texts are central and what constitutes a contribution to discourse, we can hardly speak of a crystallized intellectual
movement.
Applying these criteria, we could hardly say that legal thought in
the United States is either one discipline or a school within a discipline.
There is no common text that one would expect all candidates for
teaching positions to have mastered. Perhaps there are some casesPalsgraf,Erie, Miranda-thatevery educated lawyer can be expected to
discuss. When, however, it comes to specifying what legal academics
should know beyond the craft of lawyering, the profession flounders.
The foundational article in L&E, the one everyone has to know, is
Coase's spectacular but simple refutation 25 of the conventional
Pigouvian theory of externalities. 26 This article should have been the
last economic word on the law, for the theorem holds that under ideal
conditions, the law is irrelevant to the allocation of productive resources that the affected parties themselves will agree upon.
In the beginning Coase's article had very little influence on the
thinking of law professors. Calabresi continued to write as though the
Pigouvian theory was correct: automobile accidents were an externality
of the activities that caused them.2 7 If the field of L&E depended on
Coase's article alone, it might have remained a peripheral inquiry into
the impact of transaction costs on economic predictions derived from
the Coasian model of bargaining under ideal circumstances. For economics to have a serious impact on law, what was needed was not a
hypothesis about the law's irrelevance, but a norm that would help lawyers and judges get on with their work of deciding cases.
The critical move came in the revival of the Kaldor-Hicks conception of economic efficiency. 28 Pareto efficiency, which requires that
everyone actually be better off (or no worse off) than under inefficient
solutions, provides little help to the law; it rules out coercive interventions that make some people worse off. And what is the law except a
system for doing precisely that? In contrast, the Kaldor-Hicks standard
of efficiency permits the courts to intervene and harm one party for the
sake of another. A court may coerce A to transfer an asset to B if under
ideal conditions, B would have had the incentive to pay 4 an amount
sufficient to induce A voluntarily to transfer the asset to him. From the
point of view of efficiency, it does not matter whether B compensates 4,
for the transfer of the asset to the person who values it more (namely
25. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
26. A. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 134 (4th ed. 1932).
27. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1965).
28. A. Feldman, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory 142-43 (1980) (definition of Kaldor-Hicks criterion).
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B) is "economically" efficient. Compensation is a secondary question
that belongs more to the domain of equity than of economic inquiry.
So far as I know, the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency first came
to the attention of lawyers in Michelman's remarkable article on the
takings clause. 2 9 But efficiency did not become a buzzword in theoretical legal discourse until after Posner's textbook claimed that there was
nothing untoward about applying the standard of efficiency to solve
cases. 30 Supposedly, judges in the common law have always sought the
efficient solution to legal conflicts.
Within the parameters of L&E, it is fairly easy to identify a contribution to the field. The best thing to do is to show how the standard of
efficiency accounts for other areas of law, to develop a new argument
about why the legal system is efficient, or to propose legal reform that
will advance efficiency. 3 ' As "normal science," '3 2 this kind of work carries forward and confirms the methods and premises of the school.
As the basic texts of Critical Legal Studies, I would nominate Roberto Unger's first book, Knowledge and Politics33 and Duncan Kennedy's
first major article, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication.'' 34 Unger's book convinced large numbers of thoughtful law
professors that liberalism was rife with insoluable antinomies, causing
many American academics on the left to distance themselves from the
liberal left. Kennedy's article carries forward the theme of insoluable
antinomies and argues that contract doctrine can never overcome the
endless dialectic of individualism and altruism.
As the theme of efficiency can be played out across the domain of
legal inquiry, so do the arguments of indeterminancy, antinomy and
incoherence lend themselves to easy replication. It is not hard to argue
that "general rules do not decide concrete cases" or that a particular
argument in the law lends itself to manipulation.3 5 It has all been said
before.
As the two extremes in current thought, L&E and CLS have more
in common than their respective practitioners realize. First, both are
the offspring of well-established schools of legal thought that have
29. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1174 (1967).
30. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 6-8 (1st ed. 1973). A version of the same
standard is found in Calabresi's influential theory of the "cheapest cost avoider." See G.
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 136-40 (1970).
31. See Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J.
Legal Stud. 65 (1977).
32. T. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10 (2d ed. 1970).
33. R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975).
34. 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
35. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 591 (1981) (arguing that the temporal range of the criminal act arbitrarily expands
and contracts).
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gone out of style. Yet both movements anguish about their filial ties to
the past.
Advocates of economic efficiency are the contemporary bearers of
the basic Benthamite insight that all legal rules must serve a purpose
and the only sensible purpose to pursue is the welfare of society. Also,
the champions of the L&E version of efficiency, in contrast to mainline
economists, concur in the Benthamite assumption that we can measure
and compare the welfare of one person with that of another. Posner
and his followers might disagree with Bentham about the proper standard of welfare;3 6 Posner favors aggregate wealth rather than happiness as the standard of welfare.3 7 This is but an in-house dispute akin
to other disagreements such as whether to pursue average or aggregate
welfare.
The anti-law wing of CLS draws on many arguments that I had
always thought the realists from Holmes to Llewellyn had already beat
into banality. Many of the realists, at least, had a clear, political motive
behind their repeated attacks on law as a "brooding omnipresence in
the sky." 3 8 They had a political agenda: to open legal discourse to new
social and political possibilities.3 9 Apart from internal law school poliincreasing their own influence, the
tics, such as hiring practices and
40
mystery.
a
remain
CLS
of
goals
There is nothing about the literature of L&E that identifies the
movement as rightist; or of CLS, as leftist. Utilitarianism, with its emphasis on social solidarity, tends to be a doctrine of the left, and antilaw skepticism can just as easily serve the purposes of the right or of
New Deal liberals as it can serve the transient needs of CLS. (CLS
thinkers should be the first to admit the intrinsic manipulability of their
own doctrines.) This very connection to the past-that the same ideas
have been deployed for different political purposes-may be precisely
cultivates its debt to predecessors
the reason that neither L&E nor CLS
41
of different political persuasions.
Now I should like to apply the same general criteria-shared text
and consensus about "insights"-to explore the way in which the essays in this symposium reflect a third path of legal thought. The
36. R. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Social Thought, in The Economics of
Justice 48 (1983).
37. Posner also thinks he distances himself from utilitarians on the permissiblity of
theft when it serves the greater happiness of the thief. Id. at 63. He ignores the ingenu-

ity of utilitarians in factoring in costly side effects-such as the demoralization of
others-that easily support prohibitions such as the one against theft.
38. Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

39. See B. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 6-22 (1984).
40. For a useful clarification of the CLS position on formulating a political agenda,
see Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings,
36J. Legal Educ. 505, 510-11 (1986).
41. On the problematic relationship of CLS to the Realists, see Tushnet, supra note
40, at 507-08.
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boundaries of this school are defined by the twin premises: (1) individ42
uals have rights that "trump" the demands of utility and efficiency,
and (2) it is possible to shape (if not determine) our moral and legal
lives by constructing norms to live by. The first premise sets the third
school apart from L&E, the second from CLS. There is no journal, no
national conference, no charismatic leader that unites this loosely knit
group ofjurisprudential thinkers. But nonetheless I would submit that
a large group of scholars in American and Canadian law schools are
bound together in an effort to ground legal principles in sound, nonutilitarian values. Barnett refers to the third group as the "normative
legal philosophers. '4 3 Ackerman characterizes their enterprise as
Constructivism. 44 The label is not as important as the shared commitment to the stated premises of discourse.
The central text of our time that builds on these premises is Rawls'
A Theory ofJustice.4 5 Virtually everyone disagrees with some aspects of
Rawls' argument, but his is the text likely to be considered foundational
by those who accept these two premises.
Rawls' text is foundational partly because it demonstrates the
power of analytic philosophy in working out a substantive theory ofjustice. The centrality of Rawls in the third way, however, seems to relegate the study of Kant to a course in the history of philosophy. If we
have a modem as teacher, why do we need an eighteenth century Kanigsberg professor? The question "Why Kant?" takes on new urgency.
The answer, partly, is that writers in this third group display a different attitude toward their precursers than we find in the competing
schools. Rawls himself claims to be working within a contractarian tradition, in which Kant, along with Locke and Rousseau, are regarded as
"definitive" theorists.4 6 If work grows out of a tradition, then it is important to know what that tradition teaches and to clarify the way in
which the contemporary argument both draws on and departs from its
sources.
Further, Rawls' principles of justice and the methodology of the
original position are explicitly limited to working out the basic framework of social cooperation. The perturbations that constitute the stuff
of legal controversy belong to the field of "partial compliance," a field
of justice that Rawls, for good reason, excludes. 4 7 Typically, the
threshold question in a private legal dispute is whether one person has
42. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously xi (1977).
43. Barnett, Book Review, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1230-34 (1984).
44. B. Ackerman, supra note 39, at 72-104; B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 327-48 (1980).
45. J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1971).
46. Id. at I1 n.4. Rawls obviously regards Kant as more influential in his work than
either Rousseau or Locke. See the section entitled "The Kantian Interpretation ofJustice as Fairness," id. at 251-57. There is no comparably extensive discussion of any
other philosophical precursor.
47. Rawls, supra note 45, at 351.
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improperly transgressed against or harmed another. Rawls' method of
the original position has little to teach us about the rules we should
fashion to cover these disputes, for there is no way in the original position to adopt a rule that would be satisfactory to both transgressor and
victim.

48

Kant, by contrast, explicitly addresses not only the foundations of
the legal system but also specific details of the law of property, contracts, family relations, and criminal law. Whether we ultimately agree
with Kant, he offers us more than does Rawls in his challenge to conventional views about the basic institutions of the law. These are some
reasons, then, for our turning to Kantian legal theory.
In reading these essays the reader must pay close attention to certain problems of translation. There is no clear way to render the German terms Recht, Gesetz, Wille, and Willkiir. In brief, the term Recht, best
translated as Right, stands for law in the ideal sense; Gesetz, for law in
the sense either of enacted law or empirically established scientific
law. 49 Though these two conceptions of law can be readily kept apart,

two traps can easily ensnare the unwary readers of the articles in this
symposium. First, the reader should watch out for the words "just"
and 'justice"; it is never clear whether the topic under discussion is
justice (Gerechtigkeit in German) or the concept of Right (Recht). 50 The
confusion originates with John Ladd's incorrect translation of Kant's
treatise on legal theory, die Rechtslehre.5 1 Apparently, Ladd regarded
the term Right, relied upon by Hastie in his nineteenth century translation,5 2 as archaic and opted for "justice" as the best translation of
Recht.53 Because his translation is the only one now readily available in

English, it is widely used, with accompanying confusion.
A related problem of translation is hardly avoidable. When Kant
speaks of the categorical imperative as the moral "law," he uses the
term Gesetz. Even though this law stands as an ideal of human behavior,
it is treated as analogous both to enacted positive laws and to scientific
laws. 54 The different terms for law in German keep distinct the ideal of
48. All legal systems concur, for example, that a woman may use deadly force to
prevent being raped. In the original position, however, no one would know whether he
would turn out to be a rapist or a victim. It would not be rational, therefore, to agree in
advance to a rule that permitted one to be killed, should one turn out to be a rapist. On
the requirements of the maximin solution that every possible outcome be acceptable,
see id. at 152-57.
49. For further elaboration, see Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 Yale
LJ. 970, 980-84 (1981).
50. The difference between these two concepts is important. See Fletcher, Law and
Morality, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 533 (1987).
51. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3.
52. Philosophy of Law, supra note 3.

53. Ladd has a useful discussion about the terms Recht and Gesetz in his introduction. See Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 3, at xv-xviii.
54. It is not clear to me which analogy is stronger. The connection with enacted
laws is that both stem from a lawgiver; in the case of the moral law, reason legislates for
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the moral law from the ideal law, the principles of Right that govern
human interaction in civil society.
The terms Wille and Willkir both translate as "will" and therefore
special caution is required in discussing Kant's notion of free will. In
Kant's moral theory the dominant term is Wille; it is the medium by
which reason becomes practical and issues in action. 5 5 In the legal theory the dominant term is Willktir, which is typically translated as
choice. 5 6 I tend to think of Willktir simply as the realization of prefer57
ences, regardless of their conformity with reason and the moral law.
Animals have Willkiir, i.e., inclinations and preferences, but they do not
have Wille. 58 Problems arise in joining the adjective "free" to either of
these German terms for "will." The resultingfreier Wille is redundant,
for the Wille, when it renders pure reason practical, is by definition
free. 59 There is a point, however, to distinguishing a free Willklyr from
one not free. Kant defines the former as Willk&r "that can be determined by pure reason."' 60 Human Wilkzfr is free in so far as it is affected by impulses but not determined by them. "[I]t can . . . be
determined to actions by pure Will (Wille)." '6 1 The freedom of Willklyr,
therefore, consists in its potential: the possibility that the actor will act
freely, determined only by reason and Wille.
In encountering the terms "free choice" or "free will" in these
pages, particularly in Weinrib's essay, the reader should remember that
what is meant is not free will in the contemporary sense of being able to
choose any act freely, but in the limited Kantian sense of Willkzwr that is
capable of being determined by reason alone. The criminal does not
act freely, but he does have the potential of transcending the impulses
that lead to criminal deeds. In the latter sense alone he has "free will"
or "free choice."
I will close with a few words about the positions staked out in this
symposium. In the debate between Finnis and Richards, we are treated
to a confrontation that rarely occurs in modem America. We find two
itself. See I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals *432 (L. Beck trans. 1969)
[hereinafter Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals]; Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at xv. The connection with scientific laws derives from the element of
necessity in both. Scientific laws state a necessary connection between events, and the
moral law necessitates a response from autonomous reason. On the role of necessity in
deriving the categorical imperative as a law, see Fletcher, supra note 50, at 538-40.
55. See Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 54, at *446-47 ("will
is a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are rational").
56. Ladd uses the term "will" for both but capitalizes "Will" for Wille, and uses
lower case "will" for Willkzir. See Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 3, at
xxv-vi.
57. But see Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 559
(1987) (disputing this interpretation).
58. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *213.
59. Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 54, at *446.
60. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *213.
61. Id.
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serious philosophers engaging each other on both the moral quality of
homosexual love and the legitimacy of prohibiting this and other forms
of private, consensual sexual conduct. The debate about prohibiting
certain disfavored sexual practices typically turns on speculations
whether these practices (or rather public perceptions of what happens
in other people's bedrooms) offends ordinary sensibilities, and if so,
whether this offense justifies the intervention of the criminal law.
Rarely do philosophers seek to get behind conventional views of "sin"
and assess the intrinsic quality of the conduct. 62 Finnis and Richards
shift the discussion away from an inquiry into whether immoral conduct
harms society, and toward the more basic question of whether homosexuality is immoral in the Kantian sense. Finnis favors a narrow reading, Richards a broader, more accommodating interpretation of Kant's
moral theory. Both seem to agree, however, that the dictates of the
moral theory should shape the legitimate range of legal coercion.
The problem of fathoming the relationship between Kant's moral
and legal theory engages virtually all the contributors to this symposium. Weinrib, Grey, and I implicitly part company with Richards and
Finnis on the structure of Kant's thought. Weinrib locates the general
problem of the relationship in the context of the wider discussion today
about the priority of the right over the good, the former associated with
the legal, the latter with the moral theory. Weinrib claims not only that
the legal is logically prior to the moral, but that the moral should be
seen as a reasoned instantiation of rightful legal interactions. For
Weinrib, the priority of the legal theory derives from its concern with
human interaction or "purposiveness" in general; the moral theory di63
Thus
rects our attention to specific purposes dictated by reason.
Weinrib differs from Finnis and Richards by stressing the distinctive
domain of the moral life.
If Grey and I differ from Weinrib, it is not so much on the issue of
the scope of the moral and the legal, as it is on the logical relationships
between these two dimensions of Kant's thinking. As Weinrib insists
that the law itself must be understood as an intelligible, integrated
whole, he finds in Kant the conceptual connections that have eluded
many readers of the same texts. 64 Grey adds an important dimension
to the discussion by bringing to bear Kant's political and historical writings and thus underscoring the historical contingency of many of
Kant's legal prescriptions. My own paper turns inward to the text of
62. This is the shortcoming of the discussion a generation ago. See P. Devlin, The
Enforcement of Morals (1965); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 17-24 (1963)

(responding to Devlin).
63. See Weinrib, Kantian Legality as Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472 (1987);

infra notes 66-67.
64. Professor Wolfgang Naucke of the University of Frankfurt, West Germany,
agreed strongly with Weinrib that the legal and moral theory must stand in some close
logical connection. He does not necessarily concur with Weinrib's specific view of this

connection.
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the Rechtslehre and works through many important details of Kant's
views of law and morality.
No area of Kantian thinking provokes us more than his stringent
injunction on punishment. Even if a society were to disband, he claims,
the last murderer languishing in prison must first be executed. 65 Any
deviation from the principle of retributive punishment would entail the
death ofjustice and mean that it would "no longer [be] worth while for
men to remain alive on this earth."' 6 6 The themes of law, justice, and
morality invariably converge in ajudicial judgment sending one of us to
the gallows. 67 No wonder then that Murphy wrestles with Kant's theory
of punishment as a microcosm of conflicting strains in Kant's
68
thoughts.
The disagreements that emerge in these discussions demonstrate
the vitality of our inquiry. These essays may be the first step in discovering and appreciating this neglected aspect of Kant's thinking.
65. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *333.
66. Id. at *332.
67. For further elaboration, see Fletcher, supra note 50, at nn. 550-52.

68. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 509
(1987).

